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Farewell to All That
ROBERT C. BERRING*
I. INTRODUCTION
The agreement to return Hong Kong to the People's Republic
of China (PRC)' represents both the best and the worst of the
modem international legal system. It represents the best of inter-
national law and policy because it did not involve either the. firing
of shots or any bloodshed. This non-violent resolution of Hong
Kong's forcible annexation is the paradigm for international order:
a situation imposed via force that was peacefully resolved around a
bargaining table.
2
On the other hand, the agreement to return Hong Kong to the
PRC also represents the worst of international law and policy be-
cause the negotiating parties disregarded the opinions of citizens
whom the agreement will directly affect. During the settlement
process, Great Britain aimed to preserve its prestige, and the PRC
sought to extend its sovereignty over Hong Kong. These two sov-
ereigns never gave a voice to the six million Hong Kong residents
whose futures also hang in the balance. Such neglect of public
opinion is similar to the treatment of people in the Treaty of Ver-
* Walter Perry Johnson Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Boalt Hall Law
School. Thanks to Elvin Geng for some great ideas and citations.
1. See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1371 [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
2. The three treaties by which Hong'Kong and its environs came under British con-
trol are perfect examples of unequal treaties. See Treaty Between China and Great Brit-
ain, Aug. 29, 1842, China-Gr. Brit., 93 Consol. T.S. 465 [hereinafter Treaty of Nanking];
Convention of Friendship, Oct. 24, 1860, China-Gr. Brit., 123 Consol. T.S. 71; Convention
Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9, 1898, China-Gr. Brit., 186 Con-
sol. T.S. 310. British protests to the contrary represent revisionist history. For further
discussion, see PETER WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT
BRITAIN AND HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES (1980).
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sailles after World War I and the Yalta Conference after World
War II. These events demonstrate that powerful nations trade
territories without considering the effects of the trade on the peo-
ple within those territories. In this "board game" concept of the
world, where pieces are moved with impunity, the only issue is:
who controls the dice?
The final outcome of the Great Britain-PRC negotiations on
the return of Hong Kong to the PRC still remains to be seen.
What will happen on July 1, 1997? Will Hong Kong's transition
from Crown Colony to Special Administrative Region proceed
smoothly? Because many dependent variables compose these
complex questions, they defy analysis. Nevertheless, some parts of
the larger picture are predictable. Some developments are so cer-
tain-at least in the broad context-that they may be used as
points of analysis.
The development of Hong Kong's legal system is relatively
certain and may be safely predicted. This Article focuses on the
future of Hong Kong's legal system. Part II sets the stage to ana-
lyze Hong Kong's reversion to the PRC.' Part III analyzes the ex-
isting legal infrastructure, mainly the common law system, and
explains why neither this system nor any Western legal culture will
survive past 1997.
The previous sentence should sufficiently warn the reader of
my cynicism. Be forewarned, hard truths lie ahead.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
The return of Hong Kong to Chinese control represents the
final remnants of the colonial era. Colonialism was once a nfajor
3. The rich literature on Hong Kong's transition to Chinese control recapitulates
two major subjects. The first major issue is the history of the transition, including the
bargaining that transpired between the PRC and Great Britain. See generally WESLEY-
SMITH, supra note 2. The second topic is traditional law, particularly the Chinese doc-
trines of li and fa. See DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA
29 (1967); see also SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU
CHINA (London Sch. of Econ. Monographs on Soc. Anthropology No. 24, 1962). Li is a
Confucian doctrine that requires individuals to be treated according to their rank, rela-
tionship, and particular circumstances. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra, at 29. Fa, on the
other hand, is a legal theory that does not make exceptions for particular groups or indi-
viduals. See id. The doctrines of li and fa are closely related, and their interaction and
importance in the PRC will undoubtedly impact the legal system in Hong Kong after
1997.
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force in international affairs, and. nations viewed it favorably.4 Al-
though Hong Kong is a relic, the last major possession held by one
of the old powers, it was never a typical colony. Great Britain's
acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842 cannot be viewed as the con-
quering and swallowing of a population because it was the product
of an unequal treaty that permitted the British to take control of a
largely unpopulated area.5 The lease itself, while clothed in legal-
ese,6 was not a negotiated agreement; rather, Great Britain im-
posed it upon China.
One might ask how Hong Kong lasted so long as a Crown
Colony. Bringing Hong Kong back under Chinese control has
been part of every twentieth-century Chinese leader's agenda.
Chairman Mao Tse-Dong was no exception. In 1949, the British
rushed troops to Hong Kong to prevent a Red Army invasion.
Once the dust of the revolution settled, however, the PRC seemed
to accept Hong Kong. Rather than harassing Hong Kong, the
PRC chose to make good use of it-even though as a tiny freckle
on the face of the PRC, the PRC could easily have overrun it.
Even the chaos of the Cultural Revolution did not lead to the end
of Hong Kong as a Crown Colony.
Ultimately, Hong Kong served everyone in some way. The
British retained a touch of colonial glory and acted as a major
player in the Cold War by maintaining a Western foothold against
the Communist Bloc. The PRC used Hong Kong as a place to
move money and information-an entrep6t to the world. The
people of Hong Kong became rich, or at least hoped to become
rich, while avoiding the deadly comic opera of the PRC's political
gyrations. The United States gained an allied presence in the Pa-
cific Rim and demonstrated the superiority of the Western way of
life. The world acquired an international free port, where laissez-
faire economics held sway and money was to be made. The ar-
rangement exemplified John Rawls' famous maxim: everyone
4. For an illustration of the colonial era, see EJ. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EMPIRE
1875-1914 (1987).
5. See Treaty of Nanking, supra note 2. Thesecond Opium War and the Convention
of Friendship followed the Treaty of Nanking. See Convention of Friendship, supra note
1.
6. See Convention Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, supra note 2.
7. See generally FRANK WALSH, THE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 441-47 (1993).
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came out at least a little ahead of the game.3
There is als6 a certain inertia to intransigent international
problems. Some situations are so intractable that no solution is
immediately available without huge costs. Taiwan, Northern Ire-
land, and Palestine are vastly different examples of this phenome-
non. Each nation presents a seemingly unsolvable problem that
the rest of the world-and sometimes the nations involved-are
willing to ignore. If seeking a cure is too risky, stabilizing the mat-
ter is enough. The current problem in Bosnia exemplifies what oc-
curs when stability cannot be attained. There is safety in the status
quo.
Hong Kong fits into this category of misfits perfectly. From
the Western perspective, disentangling the Crown Colony from
Great Britain was too problematic. Although Great Britain was
clearly in the wrong historically, returning a pait of the free world
to a communist regime was too difficult to consider.
From the Chinese perspective, Hong Kong brought money,
expertise, and a window into the rest of the world. Would it be
worth risking serious military engagement with Great Britain and
the United States to reclaim it? The edgy Cold War context-now
quite difficult to recreate--with nuclear warheads poised to de-
stroy great areas of the world and Chairman Mao happily pro-
claiming that he had no fear of nuclear war, made anything seem
possible; however, the PRC held back. As long as Hong Kong ex-
isted, it could be left alone.
Some speculate that Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping would
even have allowed Hong Kong to drift past 1997 if the British had
acted properly, but we will never know. British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher's trip to the PRC to meet with Chinese Pre-
mier Zhao Zhiyang began the chess game.' ° Once the process
started, it could not be stopped. It became driven by July 1, 1997,
the day the "lease" ends. Great Britain was not paying rent for the
lease because it imposed the lease as an unequal treaty on an un-
8. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61-62 (1971).
9. As a teacher of undergraduate students, I see how difficult it is to convey the
tension and sense of impending doom that once prevailed.
10. See John H. Henderson, Note, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the People's
Republic of China.: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L 503,513 n.43 (1995).
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willing China. The original outright grant of Hong Kong was in-
tended to resolve the Opium War," but that justification would not
go very far in the late twentieth century. The survival of nine-
teenth century imperialism was certainly not the real justification
for the continued existence of Hong Kong. Yet once its spirit was
invoked, there was a bright line in the future. Unlike Taiwan,
Northern Ireland, and Palestine, the certain date of July 1, 1997
called for action.
This context is crucial to understanding what has transpired.
The British had to save face, and the Chinese wanted back what
was unarguably their territory. The Joint Declaration of the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on
the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) 2 served as the
conduit. Despite all of its problems, the bargaining process ac-
complished the goals of both Great Britain and the PRC. The
British will retire with grace, and the Chinese will fulfill their long
cherished goal of eliminating the last remnant of the embarrassing
days of Western imposition. Given that, what happens after the
new flag is raised?
III. WILL THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM ENDURE?
Will the common law system and the existing legal infrastruc-
ture of Hong Kong survive the transition? The answer to this
question is clear if it is based on documented evidence-the Joint
Declaration 3 and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Basic Law).
14
The Joint Declaration reads: "The Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region will be vested with executive, legislative and inde-
pendent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. The
laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically un-
changed."'5
Could it be more clear? The PRC has promised that there
11. See id. at 508.
12. Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China (1990). reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
15. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3), at 1371.
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will be no change for at least for fifty years: the legal system will
remain intact, the laws will stay the same, and the judiciary will be
independent. Indeed, PRC officials continue to offer reassur-
ance. 1 6 Given the explicit wording of the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law, how can one doubt such an outcome? Nevertheless, I
not only doubt the eventual outcome, but also contend that neither
the common law system nor the current legal infrastructure can
possibly survive in Hong Kong after the lease expires. Four rea-
sons support my belief: (1) the nature of the common law itself,
(2) the concept of judicial independence, (3) the Chinese legal
tradition, and (4) the lack of means to enforce the language of the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
A. The Nature of the Common Law
Author Benjamin Schwartz once wrote that the only time that
we in the West can ever agree on who and what we are is when we
contrast ourselves with someone else. 7 The common law exem-
plifies this observation. Understanding the nature and the ration-
ale of the common law is no easy task. As a professor who
teaches Contracts to first-year law students, I am keenly aware of
the difficulty of making people understand that there is law that is
not authored by legislative or executive bodies or that may not be
written down.'8 What is the source of these rules? Are they really
the product of the experience of the people? The answer, which is
quite complex, is based on a blend of British history, the Christian
origins of Western natural law, and a heady brew of elements that
common law scholars still dispute.'9
The very existence of the common law system is its most pow-
erful attribute. Because this system is alive and functions, it carries
with it the power of practice. Scholars debate about its origins or
16. See Li Peng Gives a Banquet in Honor of All Members of HKSAR Committee and
Reiterates the Guarantee to Implement the Guidelines and Policy Toward Hong Kong, 3
HSIN HUA YUEH PAO TSUNG MU [NEW CHINA MONTHLY] 28,28-29 (1996).
17. See BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ, IN SEARCH OF WEALTH AND POWER: YEN EI AND
THE WEST 1-2 (1964).
18. The British demonstrate this phenomenon to an extreme by having an unwritten
constitution, but it is familiar enough to U.S. legal scholars.
19. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 50-55 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1930). Pound's essay remains the most con-
cise statement of the nature of the common law and the issues surrounding it.
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its functions. These debates may represent brilliant intellectual
exegeses, but they simply attempt to describe that which -exists. It
is undeniable that the common law system-no matter how or why
it came to be-represents the current stage of evolution of the
British legal culture. Common law only makes sense in such an
environment. Whatever may have been the crucial steps in its
evolution, we may only speculate on how it reached this point.
The common law cannot be effectively transferred outside this
context.
Despite all of the power of the common law's existence, it is
very difficult to explain, even to members of the originating cul-
ture. How could such a system, rooted so deeply in British legal
history and traditions, make sense to Chinese people who come
from a very different, much older and richer, set of traditions?
Our sense of cultural-superiority may be so profound that we be-
lieve, the common law-a product of our own history and cul-
ture-would be useful to everyone, but evidence and common
sense tell us otherwise.
In many post-colonial settings, the nation builders left behind
consisted almost entirely of individuals trained in the colonizing
power's system. The colonizer's language became the language of
the educated classes in the new state.2 ' The colonizing power's
culture became identified as the superior culture. Although the
new nation's builders purposefully sought to reject the colonizing
state as a model, the dominance of the colonizing power's cultural
models would cast an inescapable shadow. The former colony
would eventually follow the colonizer's model because it could
only work with concepts that it knew and ideals to which it had
been subjugated.
Under this theory, some mutation of the common law might
be expected to play a powerful role in Hong Kong after 1997, but
this will not be the case. Once the PRC reclaims Hong Kong, the
PRC will bring its own legal personnel, legal culture, language, and
20. For example, in India,.a country that Great Britain once colonized, "English 'is
the most important language for national, political, and commercial communication."'
Scott E. Kauff, Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of Hazards, Emergency Planning, and
Training in the Workplace: India's Factories Act and the United States' Hazard Communi-
cation Standard, 17 CoMP. LAB. L. 565, 573 n.59 (1996) (quoting India, in CENTRAL
I-T'ELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1994, at 184, 184 (1994)).
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rich legal tradition to Hong Kong.2 1 Chinese will soon become the
language of the elite. At the risk of offending the British, the Chi-
nese will neither need nor be compelled to use Great Britain as a
model for anything. The Chinese will not need British infrastruc-
ture to define the operation of bureaucracies. Chinese govern-
ments have been organizing bureaucracies for several millennia.2
Furthermore, the Chinese have a legal tradition that dates back
thousands of years 3 Hong Kong is more realistically viewed as an
annexed territory that is being handed from one world power to
another. Such a new power has no need for old systems. On the
contrary, there are incentives to create new systems, and the PRC
has the models and personnel to do so.
The common law has no cultural claims to offer. No social
heritage constituencies support it. The quaint trapping of the
common law system may be maintained for a short time, but will
wither and die at each challenge. Every tradition has nonsensical
rituals that are accepted as part of the culture. The Chinese will
have no reason to accept British rituals, they come fully equipped
with their own.
The problem of language poses another challenge. Common
law literature is not written in a language that most Chinese people
can re'ad 24 Even if they could, it would not make sense to them.
The fact that the judiciary in Hong Kong is composed mostly of
expatriates, English-speaking judges from around the world,"
demonstrates how divorced the common law is from the Chinese
experience. The PRC will no longer tolerate a legal culture that
progresses in the language of another culture.
My friend from Hong Kong, a legally trained British citizen
21. The Republic of China still claims sovereignty over mainland China, just as the
PRC claims sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. I would contend that the common law
and tie existing Hong Kong legal infrastructure would have just as small a chance of sur-
viving if the Taiwanese government took control of Hong Kong.
22. See generally HOBSBAWM, supra note 4.
23. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 7-8 (referring to a 1955 study that recov-
ered codes and judicial procedure rules from the first Chinese imperial dynasty, the Han
Dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 220)).
24. See Richard Klein, Law and Racism in an Asian Setting: An Analysis of the Brit-
ish Rule of Hong Kong, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 223,223-24 (1995).
25. For example, in R. v. Kwong Kim Wah, [1996] 1 H.K.C. 161 (Dist. Ct.), the judge
was an expatriate with minimal knowledge of the Chinese language.
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who deeply believes that the common law will survive past 1997,
told me that he is amazed that Hong Kong trials are now being
conducted in Cantonese. He pondered the ptoblem of how appel-
late judges, who must work in English, will review such trials. He
noted that Chinese would never work as a legal language. In re-
sponse, I informed him that it has been the legal language of China
for thousands of years. Furthermore, English will not. survive as
the language of Hong Kong's government because government
officials will be Chinese speakers unwilling to import expatriates.
Accordingly, the common law cannot survive as an institution.
B. Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is such an integral part of the common
law tradition that it requires a separate discussion. The explicit
guarantee of judicial independence indicates that the negotiating
26parties saw its centrality to Hong Kong's current legal system.
There is no guarantee, however, that judicial independence will be
a reality.
The common law system rests upon the judiciary's independ-
ence. By judicial independence, I refer to a judge's ability to
make a decision without reference to the executive aithority's de-
sires. What gives judges such power and status? As U.S. residents,
we can barely understand it ourselves; however, due to a mix of
historical, philosophical, and cultural reasons, it does work. In the
United States, a judge may defy a President," invalidate a law of
Congress,2' or order a state or a city to abide by his order.29 Given
the reluctance of any sovereign to be bound by another authority,
this phenomenon is remarkable. Judicial independence is not
without its tensions and failures, but it is remarkably resilient. The
common law operates under the same principle. While analysts
may empty many ink cartridges in their printers trying to parse the
wherefores of judicial independence, it still exists as a result of
English legal history and its expansion in the English-speaking
colonies. It is the hallmark of the U.S. judicial system..
This tradition finds no counterpart in two millennia of Chi-
26. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(3), at 1371.
27. See U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,713 (1974).
28. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 7,70-72 (1803).
29. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,57-58 (1990).
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nese legal history. The traditional Chinese magistrate was a ser-
vant of the Emperor and could not operate outside of the author-
ity structure.0 Whatever forces blended to create the judge's role
in the common law, they do not exist in the Chinese tradition.
Furthermore, the judge's role in the common law did not take root
in Communist China. Because the Communist Party controls the
decisions of the state and judges in the PRC must serve the state,
Chinese judges are never free from the Communist Party's hold.31
Some of my colleagues in the PRC have written about judicial
independence and PRC's progress toward it;32 however, these
writings are only the aspirations of academics and theorists. A
court's ability to defy the Communist Party and to be independent
goes against deep cultural attitudes. Only when a judge can defy
the dictates of the Communist Party-with the knowledge that his
opinion might stand-will real progress be made. The judicial
function in PRC remains subservient to the sovereign, which
completely alters the equation of the legal system and means that
Hong Kong judges will serve the Communist Party. Similar to cur-
rent judges in Special Economic Zones, the future Hong Kong
judges may be given more freedom in economic cases. When a
matter of paramount importance to the Communist Party arises,
however, such as a case that tests the system's mettle, the judge's
role must fit into the franiework of Communist Party rule-to
think otherwise is naive.
C. Chinese Legal Tradition
The Chinese legal tradition is at great odds with the common -
law tradition. Thus, hopes for tolerating common law norms are
slim. While a topic as broad as the Chinese legal tradition hardly
avails itself to short treatment, I will elucidate some of its salient
features.
30. See William P. Alford, On the Limits of 'Grand Theory' in Comparative Law, 61
WASH. L. REV. 945,952 (1986).
31. See KEN JOWITT, NEW WORLD DISORDER: THE LENINIST EXTINCTION 306-31
(1992). It is a mistake to think of the Chinese system without referring to Leninism.
While many academics think that the Marxist theory is the most salient feature of the
PRC's future, it is more likely that the Leninist party, with its absolute authority struc-
ture, will affect the PRC the most. See id. at 15-16, 21, 23,315.
32. See, e.g., Shizhou Wang, The Judicial Explanation in Chinese Criminal Law, 43
AM. J. COMp. L. 569 (1995).
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1. Law Is a Tool of the Sovereign
In his book Chinese Democracy,3 Andrew Nathan examines
the commonalties of each of the eleven constitutions authored by
the regimes controlling, at least in theory, the Chinese mainland
throughout the twentieth century.- This group of constitutional
documents includes drafts of the Q'ing Dynasty, the Kuomintang
(KMT),5 and the early Chinese Communist Party, as well as each
of the four official constitutions ratified by the PRC. 6 One impor-
tant similarity in each of these constitutions-whether drafted by
the Imperial Commission of the Q'ing, Republican idealist re-
formers like Sun Yat Sen, the civil law inspired draftsmen of Chi-
ang Kai Shek, Stalinist communists, or Maoist idealists-is that the
state holds and grants power to the citizens?" There is no contrac-
tual basis for government in society, no agreement among citizens
to create a government, and no underlying rights rooted in the citi-
zenry. No ultimate power resides in the people to check the state's
actions. The state is superior.
This line of analysis leads to the difficult area of human rights.
Without going into an extended discussion of human rights in Chi-
nese politics,3 9 it is sufficient to state that Chinese legal tradition
consisted of civil rights, but not natural or human rights. 40 "'It
must be realized at the outset that constitutional rights should not
be based on the theory of natural rights. It is beyond controversy
that any enforceable right is the creation of the law. Only when
the law recognizes a certain right is such a right legally pro-
tected.
, , 4'
It is hardly surprising that such a theory is rooted in the impe-
rial Chinese tradition. In traditional China, power in legal rela-
33. ANDREW J. NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY (1985).
34. See id. at 107-32.
35. The Kuomintang was China's Nationalist Party. See id. at 110.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 111.
38. See id. at 112.
39. For a discussion of human rights in Chinese politics, see R. RANDLE EDWARDS
ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (1986).
40. See NATHAN, supra note 33, at 115-16.
41. Id. at 115 (quoting a 1982 editorial from Red Flag, the leading theoretical journal
of the Chinese Communist Party).
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tionships flowed vertically from a superior to an inferior.4 2 Tradi-
tional Chinese courts were designed to demonstrate the Empire's
power and wisdom. The magistrate was a fearsome personage,
empowered by the Dynastic Code to torture witnesses in the
courtroom.43 The court was a place for redressing wrongs; fairness
to the parties was not at issue. One indication of this fact was that
the Codes forbade lawyers. The Empire believed that lawyers
would only interfere with the magistrate's actions.44 Thus China
encouraged people to handle the business of their lives, including
their disputes, among themselves. Appearing in a court was seen
as a quick road to disaster.
This attitude remains in the PRC. If the Communist Party, or
for a time, Chairman Mao, Was supreme, how could either be
wrong? The courts might be needed for some cases, but they were
not designed to be fair forums. Good people worked out their own
differences, making the legal system a last resort. Furthermore,
the legal system could be used for educational, purposes. If the
state wished to make a point-to send a message to society, it
would try to execute criminals. Law was an instrument of the
state, whose power could not be challenged.
Some of my colleagues argue that China is very different to-
day. A plethora of law schools produce new lawyers and legal
workers. Courts and court cases proliferate. Nevertheless, I
would argue that the paradigm has not changed. For courts to play
a meaningful role in Chinese society, there will have to be a long
and deliberate evolution. Studies show that even current court
judgments cannot be enforced.4 The culture must change for the
institution to change."
42. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 15 (describing the political structure of
the Chou Dynasty (1027 to 221 B.C.)).
43. See Alford, supra note 30, at 952.
44. See id. at 952-53.
45. See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE PEOPLE'S RiPUBLIC OF CHINA 112 (1992).
46. At the risk of descending into total cynicism, I must point out that in the heady
days of liberalism, just before the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, I was in the PRC as a re-
search fellow at the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. My col-
leagues at the institute told me that the PRC was in the grip of a new legality and that the
regime was too weak and too insecure to ever again violate citizens' rights. Thus, the ex-
citement of a few colleagues over recent developments does not inspire great confidence.
The road to real change, if ever truly traveled, will be long and arduous.
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Perhaps courts could operate more freely in areas that least
impact state interests. This practice is beginning throughout the
PRC. When an issue touches state or Communist Party interests,
however, there is no doubt about how the system will work.
There is little hope that Hong Kong's legal infrastructure can
survive as anything more than a part of the PRC's governing appa-
ratus. It cannot resist the pull of Chinese tradition and the Lenin-
ist Party ethos. The law will continue to serve the Communist
Party and the State-it is inevitable.
2. The Use of Status-Based Solutions to Legal Problems.
Legal transactions and activities in the PRC often revolve
around "guan-shi," or the use of contacts.47 The Confucian tradi-
tion-newly revived in official doctrine but never far away in daily
life-is based on relationships between people.4 The status of the
people with whom one dealt was always apparent. One stayed
within one's group and understood one's obligations. The Confu-
cian .ethos stressed working through human relationships, not ab-
stract principles. 9 In this system, it is always easier to trust some-
one whom one understands.
People in Western legal systems have come to place faith in
institutions. Ideally, these institutions offer fair treatment and pro-
tection from predators. Most of these institutions are legal. Even
as we claim to be losing faith in them, they are at the center of our
enterprise. In court, individuals redress their wrongs, sue for jus-
tice, and defend their constitutional rights. But how does a culture
come to trust such institutions?
The reasons that the Chinese continue to have faith in people
rather than institutions are complex. The significant fact is that
the Chinese are likely to carry out legal relationships through per-
sonal contacts because what matters most to the Chinese is work-
ing with people. Winning a point through the wording of a con-
tract or prevailing on a technicality is not part of the Chinese
system. The enlivening (or excruciating) manipulation of source
materials and language underlying much of the common law is not
47. See Keith Damsell, Assessing Team Canada: B.C. Firms Find 'Things Are Never
as They Seem,' FIN. POST (Vancouver), Nov. 24, 1994, at 4, available in 1994 WL 6190642.
48. See BODDE & MORRIS, supra note 3, at 18.
49. See id
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part of this tradition. Some of my Chinese colleagues brag that the
PRC will find a new path for law that recognizes Confucian rela-
tional behavior at its base, with formal, written law, as a mere
component. They see the synthesis of entirely new structural legal
principles. If the PRC develops such law, it will be considerably
different than any law practiced in the West.
Regardless of whether the PRC synthesizes new law, it is safe
to say that the Chinese preference to work with people and the
lack of a tradition of abstract neutral principles will make it very
hard for the common law to continue. Even while the British
ruled Hong Kong, most Chinese conducted their lives according to
Chinese traditions. The colonial presence was not persuasive.
Any colonial principles that people acquired by people in Hong
Kong will now merge into the rest of Chinese culture.
D. Lack of Means to Enforce the Agreement
Once Hong Kong reverts to Chinese control, its fate will be in
the hands of the Chinese. There will be no way to ensure that the
PRC abides by the agreement set forth in the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law. It is not likely that the British will use military
force to enforce the terms of the agreement. The United Nations
will also be of no assistance, as Hong Kong will be under the
PRC's direct control after July 1, 1997.50 The Chinese will be able
to classify whatever happens in Hong Kong as an internal matter
in the PRC. After all, there can be no dispute that Hong Kong is a
part of the PRC and that the vast majority of Hong Kong's resi-
dents are Chinese. Any violations of the agreement will be a mat-
ter of domestic politics, and no one will be in a position to inter-
vene.
Furthermore, who in Hong Kong will be in a position to call
for help? Most residents, particularly members of the business
community who have been closely working as the PRC's represen-
tatives, understand that the PRC will be their government. Hong
Kong residents know that it will be in their best interests to work
with this government rather than to struggle against it. Committed
democrats, however, will have the courage to try to enforce the
terms of the Basic Law and certain individuals may see Hong
50. See Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(1), at 1371.
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Kong as a potential center for revolutionary activity-but can they
prevail? The possible success of a revolution must never be pre-
cluded, but it will not be easy. Indeed, the more vociferous pro-
tests become, the more quickly and surely the PRC will move to
consolidate its position.
Any agreement that lacks an enforcement provision is des-
tined for failure. Hong Kong lacks such potential for enforcement
through either internal channels or the court of world politics.
Hong Kong may appeal to Beijing; however, the soldiers will be-
long to the PRC. Mao may be long dead, but his fundamental ob-
servation that political power comes out of the barrel of a gun has
continually proven to be correct.5 For Hong Kong, the power
equation is easy to calculate.
The PRC will have absolute discretion to follow any agree-
ments made with the British as the price for Hong Kong's return.
Perhaps in the post-Deng era, a government will unite the PRC
under a more progressive, liberal banner, and by choice, Hong
Kong will be left alone-but I seriously question the likelihood of
such an event.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS
The future of Hong Kong directly depends on the future of
the PRC. If the post-Deng era brings continued degeneration of
the Communist party and its ability to rule a united PRC, the sce-
nario will quickly grow very serious. Such a systemic degeneration
of central power in the PRC will have massive implications. There
are many possible outcomes, yet none will quietly pass across the
world stage.
Perhaps the PRC will gradually evolve into a regional confed-
eration. The southeastern portion of mainland China clearly
shares interests with Hong Kong and Taiwan. While no Chinese
politician would endorse such a development, it could become a
reality. Indeed, such a situation cbuld become one of those de
facto unsolvable international situations previously discussed.5 If
some type of solution were to emerge, Hong Kong could find itself
with more autonomy than would be possible under any centrally
51. See Lina Hsu, Teng Will Be Pursued by 'Tiger' He Released, FREE CHINA J., Sept.
11, 1989, at 5, available in 1989 WL 2669090.
52. See supra Part II.
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coordinated regime.
In contrast, continued degeneration of the PRC's central con-
trol could create a power struggle. If such a struggle arises, the
matter could indeed become grim. While no one who works with
the PRC wants to consider the repercussions of armed conflict or
civil strife, the possibility must be acknowledged. Armed struggle
for control of the PRC has previously occurred numerous times.
On more than one occasion, commentators have compared the
PRC-with its wide economic disparity, its drift from central con-
trol, and its rampant corruption-to the KMT government of the
1930s. As the ability to control the PRC weakens, violence always
hovers. If violence occurs, Hong Kong will be only one stone in a
much larger game of Go.
Perhaps the Communist Party will revive itself and reassert
control of the PRC. Even in its weakened condition, the Com-
munist Party possesses enormous resources. If it finds a coherent
ideological base and some means to reinspire the people's faith, it
could reassert itself. The Chinese remain afraid of chaos, and thus,
highly responsive to the argument that there is a need for central
control. This response gives immediate legitimacy to a strong
party. Whether a revitalized Communist Party or another group
asserts control of the PRC, the new leadership will determine the
course of the PRC and the fate of Hong Kong.
I have studied the PRC long enough to know that it is difficult
to predict, and thus, that it would be unwise to preclude the pos-
sibility of a completely different alternative. Perhaps a new
movement, based in social, political, or religious foundations, may.
arise. Some combination of elements that seem totally unthink-
able to us today may occur, similar to the Cultural Revolution in
1966 or Deng's reforms in 1978. Such a surprising paradigm shift
would have to be powerful, however, in order to sweep away the
current thinking of Hong Kong. One safe prediction is that any
new movemernt in the PRC will not be built on Western legality or
culture. Under any scenario, Hong Kong's fate is in the PRC's
hands.
Future possibilities aside, the PRC wants to maintain Hong
Kong's viability as a trading center. I have doubts, however, that
the PRC government can indeed maintain Hong Kong. There is
too much to tempt the current leadership, too many profits to be
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skimmed, too much to do. This regime will not be a "hands-off"
economics regime like Great Britain's. Hong Kong will quickly
become like any other Special Economic Zone. There will be
money to be made, but it will have to be made the Chinese way.
One thing is certain: the checkered history of Hong Kong as a
free-wheeling, open city is drawing to a close. Whatever follows
will be different. The Western powers had a long and fascinating
adventure in Hong Kong, but that adventure is about to end.

